Comparative information
The following table shows the annual trend in development of earnings for the Company, remuneration for current and former members of the Board of Management, and the average remuneration of employees over the last five financial years based on full-time equivalents (FTEs).
Development of earnings is presented on the basis of the Company’s net income under German GAAP and adjusted EBITDA AL for the Group. This is intended to illustrate the Company’s operational performance.
The basis for the figures of the Board of Management remuneration used to present the percentage development corresponds to remuneration granted and remuneration owed within the meaning of § 162 AktG. In the first year of appointment to the Board of Management or in the first year of pension payments, “n/a” is shown in the table because in the first year no meaningful year-on-year comparison of remuneration is possible.
The group of employees taken as the basis for employee remuneration (on FTE basis) are employees from Group companies in Germany who are subject to the Group Works Agreement on Conditions of Employment for Employees not Covered by Collective Agreements (GWA AT), as these companies have broadly comparable remuneration systems in place and use comparable remuneration components. The employees included for this purpose were taken into account based on an average value for 2024. The amount of total gross employee salaries (adjusted for severance payments made) for the relevant financial year was used following the same presentation logic as for Board of Management members in order to comply with the concept of remuneration granted and owed within the meaning of § 162 (1) sentence 1 AktG. The figure for total gross employee salaries was adjusted for severance payments, which were generally paid as a result of staff restructuring measures.
|
|
|
|
|
---|---|---|---|---|
|
Change |
Change |
Change |
Change |
Earnings KPIs |
|
|
|
|
Net income (AG) under German GAAP |
43.3 % |
10.8 % |
127.7 % |
126.8 % |
EBITDA AL for the Group (adjusted) |
6.6 % |
7.7 % |
0.7 % |
6.2 % |
Current members of the |
|
|
|
|
Dr. Ferri Abolhassan |
n/a |
n/a |
n/a |
n/a |
Birgit Bohle |
16.3 % |
21.3 % |
47.1 % |
20.4 % |
Srinivasan Gopalan |
62.0 % |
28.4 % |
1.9 % |
9.7 % |
Timotheus Höttges |
18.7 % |
8.8 % |
12.3 % |
5.9 % |
Dr. Christian P. Illek |
15.1 % |
20.8 % |
5.2 % |
1.3 % |
Thorsten Langheim |
15.7 % |
13.0 % |
35.7 % |
25.5 % |
Dominique Leroy |
282.9 % |
78.9 % |
1.0 % |
41.8 % |
Claudia Nemat |
11.2 % |
19.2 % |
0.9 % |
3.1 % |
Former members of the |
|
|
|
|
Adel Al-Saleh |
2.3 % |
54.1 % |
16.9 % |
(48.7 %) |
Dr. Thomas Kremer |
38.8 % |
(87.0 %) |
(37.9 %) |
(78.0 %) |
Niek Jan van Damme |
(27.1 %) |
834.1 % |
(99.0 %) |
(100.0 %) |
Reinhard Clemens |
(46.7 %) |
(100.0 %) |
n/a |
(28.6 %) |
Average employee remuneration |
|
|
|
|
Average remuneration |
2.2 % |
3.7 % |
3.5 % |
3.6 % |
In some cases, the remuneration for the members of the Board of Management changed significantly year-on-year, this is largely not due to changes in remuneration levels agreed in Board of Management service contracts, but to the fact that multi-year remuneration instruments were paid out for the first time. Corresponding positive effects in remuneration are recorded in the 2024 financial year for Birgit Bohle and Thorsten Langheim with regard to the SMP and for Dominique Leroy with regard to the LTI payment.
In addition, the year-on-year changes in Board of Management remuneration are down to different share prices at the time of transfer of the matching shares and different levels of target achievement in the STI and LTI. The positive changes in the remuneration for Srinivasan Gopalan, Timotheus Höttges, Dr. Christian P. Illek, and Claudia Nemat are also attributable to this fact.
A contractual agreement is in place for former members of the Board of Management under which existing entitlements to STI and Variable II payments as well as transfers of shares in the SMP are settled on a pro-rata basis. As a result, remuneration for former members of the Board of Management is generally reduced considerably after their departure, as the pro-rata share of Variable II plans with a four-year term decreases continually and, as a consequence, participants can only earn smaller portions of the plans. The pension commitments of former members of the Board of Management include an annual increase in their pension payments. The annual pension payments therefore rise in line with the agreed increase. However, in the case of members of the Board of Management with pension commitments consisting of a one-time capital payment, there is a spike in the year of payment, followed by an extreme reduction in the year following the one-time payment.